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THE LEGACY OF THE TREATY OF
GUADALUPE HIDALGO
DONALD C. CUTIER

Is

THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO a milestone or a
millstone in the cultural history of the Southwest? This very important treaty in American diplomatic and military history has
been much discussed and frequently cussed.
At Guadalupe Hidalgo the Mexican War ended, and conflict
between Mexico and the United States ceased. The war concluded
at that conference table must be considered by any standards a
rather easy conflict-the end was clearly a "victor's peace." By
standards of most wars this had been almost too easy and resulted
in bringing the Mexican government to its knees and the Mexican
army to utter defeat. As a result, some people thought that the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the war, had been formulated at a moment's notice and therefore ought not to be taken
too seriously.
Some people have felt otherwise. Our friend Reies L6pez Tijerina, for example, feels that the treaty was a Magna Carta, a bill of
rights fOf the Mexican people, formerly the Spanish people of the
Southwest. Clearly the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo does have
the status of constitutional law as a document of constitutional
.stature under article VI, clause 2 which states that" All treaties
made or which shall be made under the authority of the United
States shall be the supreme law of the land." Therefore by the
United States Constitution, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
whether some people like it or not, is the supreme law of the land.
It was the end product of the war started in 1846 and consummated by treaty in February two years later.
The strategy of the war was very simple. The United States felt
that it had a grievance against Mexico over the supposed invasion
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of that area which subsequently became a part of the United States
as part of the Texas annexation treaty. As the result of a misunderstanding of the national boundary lines, the United States and
Mexico went to war during the administration of President Polk.
The war aim was simple-start an invasion of those areas desired
by the United States-New Mexico and California. A physical invasion was begun by the United States Military Department of the
West and the United States Navy cooperating in occupation of the
target areas. An occupation of northern Mexico was mounted
under the leadership of General Zachary Taylor, and when things
had been pretty well put into gear, the United States war strategy
required a duplication of the feat of Hernan Cortes, with the conquest of Veracruz, a march overland to Mexico City, and the final
reveling in the Halls of Montezuma.
The war plan was implemented fairly well. But one strange
thing occurred, for along with the invasion force of the United
States Army marched the United States peace commissioner. He
was an executive agent, really a plenipotentiary of the government
of the United States. What a show of confidence it was to send the
peace envoy with the invading army! It was a hitherto unknown
move. Nicholas Trist, much belittled by various historians of the
past, and at times called a "mere clerk of the State Department,"
was actually a man of importance. He was really chief clerk of the
department, the highest civil service appointment in the State
Department. He was not a second-rater. Furthermore, he was bilingual and-was chosen for the job in part because of his linguistic
facility. He had served earlier as United States consul in Havana.
As Trist emerges as a person, it is clear that he was a sincere and
well-prepared human being rather than some sort of a martinet
being sent to Mexico to carry out the wishes of the expansionist
president of the United States, James K. Polk. There can be no
doubt that this strange system of sending him with the invading
expeditionary force under "Old Fuss and Feathers" Winfield
Scott was something other than normal protocol or regular procedure. l
After a while in Mexico, Trist could find no one with whom to
sign a treaty, and he finally was recalled by the President, but
refused to acknowledge the order. In response to the message
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which recalled him, Trist wrote a thirty-two-page memorandum
showing why he should not be recalled at that particular time. He
continued to negotiate a treaty with whomever he could find who
could sign a treaty although it was hard to find any real government in Mexico at this time with whom to treat.
President Polk branded Trist an impudent and unqualified
scoundrel, and indeed by administrative evaluation perhaps he
was just that. Contemporary Whig opinion, that of the opposition
party, said that after Trist finally had found someone capable of
signing a treaty with him that:
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo . . . negotiated by an
unauthorized agent with an unacknowledged government, submitted by an accidental president to a dissatisfied senate has notwithstanding these objections in form, been confirmed. 2

It was hardly a highly popular treaty under those circumstances,
for there had grown up in the interval between the invasion of
Mexico and the actual consummation of military hostilities there,
two diametrically opposed movements in the United States. One
was the all-Mexico movement, the idea being to incorporate all of
that defeated nation into the United States as a result of the outcome of the war, and this was growing in intensity. But far away
in New England there was a countermovement occurring at the
same time, which touted the war as being a Southern conspiracy
to get more slave territory in order that the institution could expand to the West.
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, probably the most important
single document in Southwestern history, confirmed the United
States claims to Texas, which previously had never been acknowledged by any Mexican government. It also confirmed the United
States conquest of New Mexico carried out by Stephen W. Kearny
and the occupation of California carried out by Kearny, Sloat,
Stockton, and various other members of the United States Navy in
the Pacific. For some $15 million in indemnity and $3lJ4 million
in claims that had been laid against the Mexicans by various
United States citizens, the war Came to a close. It stopped the allMexico drive; it even stopped the discontent in New England.
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If the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo is a cornerstone to the
history-particularly the legal history-of the area of the Southwest, how did it come into being? Was Trist totally responsible for
its creation? Or did he follow orders or precedents? A recent study
by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph A. Rowley indicates that the latter is
true. 3
Trist followed very closely the instructions given to him when he
left for Mexico in the first place, instructions based on precedents
already well established. There is hardly an original thought or
phrase in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; quite to the contrary,
it is based very clearly on existing precedents, including the Northwest Ordinance, the Treaty of Louisiana, and the Treaty of
Florida-parts of which were copied out verbatim in the case of
the Mexican War treaty, without anything by way of novel approach. Trist did not contribute a single idea that went into the
treaty. Rather, he utilized a draft treaty that he carried along with
him. This draft treaty had several alternate clauses or wordings,
but by-and-Iarge Trist was not an original thinker in the writing of
the treaty. The treaty is not "Trist's Treaty," but really the treaty
of the State Department of the United States based on legal precedents which already existed, namely Article III of the Treaty of
Louisiana, which indicates that the inhabitants of the ceded territory would

be incorporated into the Union of the United States and admitted
as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the meantime, they
shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their
liberty, property and religion which they profess. 4

Many problems were created. In all fairness, however, this was
the first time that a large group of non-Anglo-speaking people,
non-Anglo culture people, were accessioned into the United States.
Granted, Louisiana had been acquired earlier, but there were only
a handful of people in all of Louisiana. The United States had acquired Florida long after it had reached its zenith and was well
into its decline. There were few if any real inhabitants of the area.
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It was a first, and for the United States, a unique situation to
which it could not become accustomed. The assimilation into the
body politic of people who were not of the same political, social,
religious, and even economic background as the people of the
United States, was a novelty. It is no wonder that culture conflict
ensued as a result of the great differences of bringing together two
distinctly different systems of life, systems of law, systems of existence. The cultural conflict that exists in the Southwest as a result
of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo is a culture conflict on almost
every level. The acquisition of new people for the United States
brought to the surface many tensions. The first of these related to
the problem of Indians who might raid across the border from one
country to the other. For example, Mexico thought that the United
States might arm the Apaches and have them sweep south of the
Gila River boundary between the two countries as a result of the
terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. This would enable the
Indians to plunder and loot the people of northern Sonora;..thereby
serving as a diversion for Americans who were moving into the
area to the north of the Gila River boundary. This problem was
solved five years and a few million dollars later by the Gadsden
Purchase, which bought the area and did away with the source of
concern.
The second of the problems pertained to the boundary line of the
Gila River. The Gila was specified as the boundary between the
United States and Mexico, such boundary to follow the principal
course of that stream. Which, indeed, was the principal course of
the Gila? Was it the south fork, the central fork, or the north fork?
The Americans knew that it was the south fork; the Mexicans were
certain that it was the north fork, while all geographers know that
it is the central fork. But neither Mexico nor the United States was
willing to give up its extreme stand. When they began to negotiate,
they never looked to historians for the answer, but rather looked
for the most favorable possible interpretation of their nation's
position in the matter.
In an effort to locate the boundary line, there was a mistake
made on the longitude and latitude of EI Paso. Somehow the negotiators' EI Paso drifted much farther north, thereby precluding
any logical calculation which might be made concerning. the
boundary.
.
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It soon became apparent that the United States needed a new
boundary line to accommodate its desires for a southern railroad
route to the Pacific. Consequently, the United States eventually
sent a railroad man to Mexico to negotiate a treaty in 1853, the
Gadsden Treaty or Treaty of Mesilla, as it is sometimes called,
which added that area to round out the physiographic destiny of
the United States in the area of the Southwest. But did it really accomplish its goal? No; somehow a mistake was made. The negotiators did not realize that the traditional boundary between Upper
and Lower California was considerably farther south than the one
established. If they had known where it was, they could have
rounded off the area and included the mouth of the Colorado
River within the United States and averted many future problems
of the division of waters called for in the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and under international law. The boundary line controversy, however, was largely solved by the Gadsden Purchase and
the American checkbook.
Other problems included filibustering activities. Some Americans, dissatisfied with the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, set out from various places north QLthe international
boundary to foment problems in Sonora and Baja California, and
even over the line from Texas into Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon.
The result was certain hard feelings at an international level.
Another of the legacies of the Treaty of 1848 resulted from the
transient nature of the boundary line itself-the Rio Grande, separating Mexico and the United States. Rivers, which frequently
change course at floodtime, are notoriously poor boundaries. The
creation of baneos as they are called, banks of earth that shifted
from one side to the other of the river sometimes several times
within the same decade, caused problems which finally have
found settlement and vindication for Mexico in the Chamisal
negotiations. This is the recent settlement between the United
States and Mexico over the largest of these great accretions of land
which shifted sides of the river in historic times. The United States
agreed to what was essentially the Mexican position concerning
such shifting river beds.
There were also land title fights, creating in the area of the
Southwest a need for title insurance to establish quiet title to land,
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that same land that was guaranteed to Hispanic residents by
treaty. Thus title, insurance was born out of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo and is merely a portion of the land problem.
Another factor concerns the value of land still in the hands of
Hispanic residents during the territorial period. With suspect title,
this land had to pass through the adjudication process, and any
sale was at bargain basement prices. This was certainly to the
disadvantage of the Hispanic land claimants and in favor of the
newly arrived residents.
Disputes over water rights also constitute a part of the legacy of
Guadalupe Hidalgo. The water of the Rio Grande watershed
belongs to both Mexico and to the United States. The rain that
falls and flows into the Rio Florido and the Rio Conchos in Mexico
has a certain bearing on the total flow of the Rio Grande as does
the water that falls into the Rio Pecos or at the headwaters of the
Rio Grande proper in Colorado. Mexico has a certain vested interest in those waters, as does the United States, all because of the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and subsequent agreements based
on that document.
Then there is the problem of subsurface mineral rights, another
legacy of the 1848 treaty. For example, a deposition for a case involving uranium in the Paguate area just west of Albuquerque was
thrown out of court recently on a technicality. The object of the
case had been to establish what happened to the subsurface
mineral rights in all of the Mexican Cession area. When the last
signature was placed on the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with
the exchange of ratifications at Queretaro, how were mineral
rights affected? Did they somehow change in form because the
land was now part of the United States or were such rights the
patrimony of the United States government as being the successor
in interest to the subsurface rights of the prior sovereigns?
In recent times we know that Mexico claimed all subsurface
mineral wealth and expropriated the oil holdings of many American and some British companies, which was a throwback to the
legal system of Spain where sovereignty automatically brought
with it such subsurface control. The question might be, raised:
Didn't the Spaniards as individuals look for gold, silver and other
precious commodities? This they did, but they did so under a
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system whereby the crown withdrew its interest in such wealth
upon payment by the exploiter of one-fifth of the precious metals
or commodities that were extracted. This quinto, as it was called,
permitted individuals to participate with the government in exploitation, but gave government 20% of the value of all production. The United States government won the Mexican war through
the expenditure of the common treasure of the United States since
it was from the national treasury that the funds came. Did the
United States government in the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in essence say such rights were granted to all people
who did not previously have subsurface mineral rights? Or did the
United States as sovereign over the new territory assume the same
rights as the nation which transferred the sovereignty? Would it
take a specific act of the Congress stating that Congress was now
making surface rights and subsurface rights part and parcel of the
same ownership pattern, much as th~ old Anglo concept of ownership in fee simple?
The military governor of California, Richard Barnes Mason,
United States Army, attempted to get miners in California to pay
the quinto. The gold rush, which followed closely on the heels of
military victory, had brought military occupation of California,
and Mason thought that it was his duty to go into the Sierra
Nevada and collect the 20% from any miners found there. He was
not successful in this attempt, for it was too impractical for him to
try to collect. But he argued, and many legal scholars could argue,
that the United States as a result of the war had the same right as
the prior sovereign had had over the land; and without any
specific congressional authorization to convey the subsurface
mineral rights to the owners of the surface, it seems possible that
the United States government is still technically the owner of all
subsurface mineral rights in all of the area of the Mexican Cession
and .of the Gadsden Purchase area as well. Obviously this is not a
question to be changed by merely addressing it, but it is an unresolved matter. 5
Another legacy is community property and women's rights in
such community property. Women, those frail flowers of Hispanic
civilization, were cloaked with extra special protection under Hispanic law. By extension this same special status followed them in
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the interpretation·of the Treaty of 1848. Each southwestern state
interprets community property laws considerably differently from
the others. It would take several hours even to broach the subject
of these differences from state to state. Suffice it here to say that
community property laws are very important in the area of the
Southwest and are a property rights legacy of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Finally there is the problem of citizenship, and it is in this area
of the treaty that the United States failed most seriously. Those
new persons taken into the United States were to be admitted as
soon as possible according to the principles of the federal constitution to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities
of citizens of the United States. How long did this take in New
Mexico? From 1848 until 1912. Anything less than full citizenship-that is, being a resident of the Territory of New Mexico-did
not fulfill these promises. That same legal recourse accorded other
citizens of the United States was not available. Worse than that,
the people of New Mexico did not even know about the system of
American law that was now being superimposed upon them. The
fiduciary responsibility, that responsibility of the guardian to the
ward that actually should have existed between these newlyminted Americans and their government, failed to materialize
after the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
The western American Indians have made considerable use of
this fiduciary non-feasance. While I served as historian for the
California Indians in their claims case in the 1950s it became apparent that they utilized the lack of government concern for Indian rights in the Mexican Cession area with telling effectiveness.
They asserted that the government's error rested on the fact that
the Indians were citizens of Mexico and therefore should have
been made citizens of the United States immediately. The United
States government's failure has been of great importance to the
Indians.
.
There is potential Hispanic use of the same aspects of the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo since the Hispanic residents of the Mexican
Cession were in the case of New Mexico and Arizona not made
citizens until 1912. It hardly seems that the government could
argue that these people had been "maintained and protected·in the _
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full enjoyment of their property." Lack of any serious attempt to
assume a fiduciary responsibility is certainly one of the first
charges against the United States. Local New Mexicans lacked
understanding of the legal system that was imposed upon them.
No one came to explain it to them or to act as their wise counsel.
As a matter of fact, even if they had understood, as far as land
titles were concerned, all Hispanic residents of New Mexico were
thought to be guilty of land fraud until they had proved that they
were innocent, rather than vice versa. The cornerstone of American jurisprudence is that one is innocent until proved guilty, but
those who claimed land under Mexican and Spanish title were
thought to be guilty until proved innocent. They had to prove that
they owned the land they utilized rather than the United States
government proving that they did not own the land which they occupied at the time of the signing of the treaty. In this regard the
United States government was guilty not only of malfeasance, but
also of non-feasance of responsibility. There can be no doubt that
the United States government, either by acts of commission or acts
of omission, did not live up to the obligations which it willingly
accepted and wrote into the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
The door is ajar. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was not
fully implemented. Justice has been delayed, but it does not need
to suffer total defeat. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo is a major
item of unfinished business on the agenda of sources of cultural
conflict throughout the Southwest. But the problem is not insoluable-a Hispanic Land Claims Commission is in order. One patterned after the Indian Claims Commission could prove to be the
best answer to an otherwise unsatisfactory situation.
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